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 trial tactics
Beginning Testimony with 
an Overview Witness
BY stEPHEN a. saltZBUrG
In a criminal case of any complexity, lawyers are reasonably concerned about whether ju-rors will understand the evidence. Prosecu-
tors may have an even greater concern than de-
fense counsel in some cases because they bear a 
heavy burden of proof, and confusion among ju-
rors may make it more difficult for prosecutors to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There are 
various ways that experienced lawyers endeavor 
to make complicated matters more understand-
able to jurors. They use visual evidence, summary 
charts of voluminous evidence under rules such 
as Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, prepare tran-
scripts to assist in comprehending recorded con-
versations, offer expert testimony to explain un-
familiar concepts and terms, and sometimes ask 
trial judges to admit pedagogical summaries un-
der rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) or 
1006. In recent years, prosecutors have found the 
use of an introductory witness to set forth an out-
line of their cases to be an effective advocacy tool. 
Some courts have found it to be too effective.
an illustrative case
In United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia reviewed the convictions of 
six defendants who, along with others charged and 
tried separately, were charged with conducting and 
conspiring to conduct a drug distribution business 
during the 1980s and 1990s in Washington, D.C. 
The government alleged that the business involved 
considerable violence, including 31 murders. The 
trial lasted 10 months before the jury found the 
defendants guilty of the drug conspiracy, a RICO 
conspiracy, and other crimes. The trial judge sen-
tenced each of the defendants to prison terms that 
were in excess of life imprisonment.
the Opening Witness
The defendants raised a host of issues on appeal, 
but the one that is the focus here is the argument 
that the defendants were unfairly prejudiced by 
the prosecution’s calling an FBI agent to testify 
as its first witness in order to provide an overview 
of the government’s case-in-chief. The court ob-
served that its “conclusions are not affected by 
whether appellants’ challenge is viewed as a ques-
tion of prosecutorial misconduct, as appellants 
contend, or a claim of abuse of discretion by the 
district court in admitting inadmissible evidence.” 
(Id. at 55.)
the Only circuit Precedent:  
a summary Witness
The court had not previously addressed the use 
of an overview witness but had identified in Unit-
ed States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983), the “obvious dangers posed by sum-
marization of evidence” by a nonexpert witness 
during the government’s case-in-chief. In Lemire, 
the government called an FBI agent, who was a 
certified public accountant, toward the end of its 
case-in-chief to summarize the evidence about 
the complex cash flow through offshore compa-
nies in a prosecution for wire fraud, interstate 
transportation of the proceeds of fraud, and con-
spiracy. The agent used four summary charts to 
organize the evidence already presented by the 
government, and the charts identified the docu-
ment in evidence from which each item of infor-
mation was drawn. The defendant objected that 
the agent lacked personal knowledge as required 
by Federal Rule of Evidence 602, but the trial 
judge admitted the agent’s testimony as “explana-
tory” rather than as “substantive” evidence.
Dangers and advantages of  
summary Witnesses
The court of appeals affirmed in Lemire and 
recognized “an established tradition” permit-
ting summary evidence to be introduced along 
with appropriate limiting instructions to the 
jury. After noting that the evidence was cumu-
lative and subject to challenge under Rule 403, 
Lemire acknowledged that a nonexpert summary 
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witness can help the jury organize and evaluate 
complex factual evidence that is elicited in frag-
ments through the testimony of many witnesses 
throughout a trial.
The Lemire opinion strongly suggests that the 
court was aware of the dangers of summary tes-
timony as well as its advantages. The court con-
cluded that the claim of unfair prejudice raised 
more troubling concerns than the Rule 602 claim.
Lemire identified three obvious dangers posed 
by summarization of evidence. First, there is a 
danger that the jury might treat the summary 
evidence as additional or corroborative evidence 
that unfairly strengthens the government’s case. 
Lemire indicated that cross-examination and lim-
iting instructions could guard against this danger.
Second, summary witness testimony poses the 
risk that otherwise inadmissible evidence might 
be introduced. Lemire found that on the facts 
presented this was not much of a risk because 
the trial participants heard the agent describe the 
documents he reviewed to arrive at the summary 
and thus were well situated to prevent reliance on 
an erroneous or misleading summary.
Third, a summary witness might permit the 
government to have more than one closing argu-
ment, because the witness might be doing just 
what the prosecutor does in summation. Lemire 
found that the agent made no controversial in-
ferences and did not pronounce judgment, and 
thus was not arguing the way a prosecutor would 
argue in closing.
the Dangers of an Overview Witness
Lemire involved a witness whose testimony came 
at the close of testimony, whereas Moore raised a 
challenge to the use of an overview witness who 
testifies at the outset of a case. The Moore court 
observed that “[o]ther circuits to address the use 
of overview witnesses have reached uniformly 
negative conclusions in view of the serious dan-
gers of prejudice to a fair trial. (Moore, 651 F.3d 
at 56.) It quoted from the First Circuit’s opinion 
in United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 119–20 
(1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted):
[S]uch testimony raises the very real specter 
that the jury verdict could be influenced by 
statements of fact or credibility assessments 
in the overview but not in evidence. There 
is also the possibility that later testimony 
might be different than what the overview 
witness assumed; objections could be sus-
tained or the witness could change his or 
her story. Overview testimony by govern-
ment agents is especially problematic be-
cause juries may place greater weight on 
evidence perceived to have the imprimatur 
of the government.
(Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)
Moore was skeptical of the government argument 
that an overview witness aids the jury by framing 
how the government’s case will unfold, and quot-
ed from the Second Circuit’s opinion in United 
States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2005): 
“[T]he law already provides an adequate vehicle 
for the government to ‘help’ the jury gain an over-
view of anticipated evidence as well as a preview 
of its theory of each defendant’s culpability: the 
opening statement.” (Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)
Moore noted that in its decision in United 
States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted), it had “recently observed that 
the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits ‘have viewed 
agents’ hearsay-laden or hearsay-based overview 
testimony at the onset of trial as a rather bla-
tant prosecutorial attempt to circumvent hearsay 
rules.’” (Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)
the testimony in Moore
The court found in Moore that all three dangers 
identified by Lemire were present. In sum, the 
court concluded as follows: “FBI Agent Sparks 
testified about evidence not yet presented while 
opining that the cooperating witnesses would 
present truthful evidence because they were in-
siders and were guilty themselves, strengthening 
The jury might treat the summary evidence as 
additional or corroborative evidence that unfairly 
strengthens the government’s case.
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the government’s yet-to-be presented case and of-
fering inadmissible evidence while providing the 
government with a second opening argument.” 
(Id. at 58.) The court offered examples of the 
problems presented by Agent Sparks’s testimony:
For example, upon being shown a map of 
the District of Columbia, FBI Agent Sparks 
confirmed that the 31 circles located on the 
map accurately reflected the locations of the 
31 charged murders, and that murders clus-
tered in certain locations occurred toward 
the beginning of the charged conspiracy. 
But no such evidence was before the jury and 
FBI Agent Sparks did not purport to testify 
from personal knowledge of each murder. 
At other points, FBI Agent Sparks referred 
to witness testimony that was never pre-
sented to the jury during the course of the 
trial. In one exemplary circumstance, FBI 
Agent Sparks testified on redirect examina-
tion that co-conspirator Erskine Hartwell 
had described his role in the conspiracy as 
supplying drugs and introducing Moore 
and Gray to Oscar Veal. When asked by the 
district court whether this information was 
“based on what [Hartwell] told [him],” FBI 
Agent Sparks agreed, prompting the district 
court to state: “The jury is going to hear his 
testimony.” Yet when asked only moments 
later by the prosecutor “if  Erskine Hartwell 
will be a witness in this case or not,” FBI 
Agent Sparks replied that he “d[idn’t] know 
for sure if  [Hartwell] will.” From portions 
of the transcript submitted by the parties to 
this court, there is no indication that Hart-
well testified at trial and hence “later testi-
mony . . . differe[d] [from] what the overview 
witness assumed.”
(Id. at 58–59 (alterations in the original) (citations 
omitted).)
The court offered another example of testimony 
by Agent Sparks that it found disturbing:
[H]e testified that it was important, in his 
view, to use cooperating witnesses in this 
case because it was “the only way” to gain 
“access to the inside information.” Ac-
knowledging that cooperating witnesses 
were “themselves . . . criminals[,] unfortu-
nately,” he further testified that the cooper-
ating co-conspirator witnesses nonetheless
know what’s going on, they have the in-
formation, they’re the eyewitnesses, ear-
witnesses, they hear what these guys are 
talking about after they commit a mur-
der, they witness a murder, they know 
where the stash locations are for drugs. . . .  
[T]hey are present when drug deals are 
done. They have been with these people 
day in and day out, and you need that 
kind of testimony. That’s the only way to 
put these kind[s] of cases together.
He also testified that the goal in a debriefing 
session was to “[g]et[ ] complete and truth-
ful information” and that it was important 
to “try and verify” the information “[j]ust to 
make sure the person is truthful, that they 
are complete.” On redirect examination, 
FBI Agent Sparks reinforced the notion 
that the cooperating witnesses were guilty 
of committing crimes in their capacity as 
the defendants’ co-conspirators:
Q: You were asked a lot of questions on 
cross-examination about cooperating 
witnesses, and you continually referred to 
them as criminals.
A: Yes.
Q: Any doubt in your mind about that?
A: None whatsoever.
(Id. at 59 (alterations in the original) (citations 
omitted).)
Going Forward
In Moore, the D.C. Circuit joined other circuits in 
“condemning the practice” of having the govern-
ment begin a criminal case with an overview wit-
ness. Despite the discretion afforded trial judges 
to control the mode and order of proof, the court 
concluded that a trial judge would have difficulty 
assuring that an overview witness does not pro-
vide the government with an unfair advantage:
The use of overview witnesses exacerbates 
the “obvious dangers” this court identified 
in Lemire in the use of non-expert summari-
zation evidence. Overview testimony offers 
an opportunity to “poison the jury’s mind 
against the defendant or to recite items of 
highly questionable evidence.” Avoidance of 
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those dangers is largely beyond the ability 
of the district court, much less the defense, 
to prevent. As the record here demonstrates, 
a trained law enforcement officer is likely to 
go as far as the questions allow, presenting 
a picture for the jury of a solid prosecution 
case based on his opinion of the strength 
and credibility of the witnesses the govern-
ment plans to call to testify at trial for rea-
sons made persuasive in view of the officer’s 
training and experience.
(Id. at 60 (citation omitted).)
The Moore court clearly stated that “[t]he gov-
ernment remains free to call as its first witness a 
law enforcement officer who is familiar with the 
pre-indictment investigation or was otherwise 
personally involved, where permissible under the 
Rules of Evidence and consistent with constitu-
tional guarantees,” and “[s]uch a witness may, for 
example, be able to provide relevant background 
information as to the investigation’s duration and 
scope or the methods of surveillance, based on 
personal knowledge.” (Id.) The court indicated 
that FBI Agent Sparks “could properly describe, 
based on his personal knowledge, how the gang 
investigation in this case was initiated, what law 
enforcement entities were involved, and what in-
vestigative techniques were used,” but “he could 
not . . . present lay opinion testimony about inves-
tigative techniques in general and opine on what 
generally works and what does not, as illustrated 
by informants who pled guilty” and could not “an-
ticipate evidence that the government would hope 
to introduce at trial about the charged offenses or 
express an opinion, directly or indirectly, about the 
strength of that evidence or the credibility of any 
of the government’s potential witnesses, including 
the cooperating co-conspirators.” (Id. at 61.)
Harmless Error
Despite its harsh criticism of Agent Sparks’s over-
view testimony, Moore held that it did not preju-
dice the defendants for several reasons. The testi-
mony identified by the defendants as problematic 
on appeal was all confirmed by trial testimony. 
The defense was focused on cross-examining testi-
fying co-conspirators and other government wit-
nesses, and the trial judge instructed the jury at 
the conclusion of Sparks’s testimony to disregard 
any opinions he offered. Most importantly, per-
haps, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.
lessons
1. Moore is not the first appellate opinion to 
discuss the dangers of overview testimony. The 
fact that a number of courts have criticized such 
testimony should put prosecutors on notice that a 
conviction may be at risk if  they utilize an over-
view witness, especially in jurisdictions where an 
appellate court has criticized the practice.
2. Moore provides defense counsel who share the 
Moore court’s concern about the use of overview 
witnesses a summary of the dangers that can be 
cited in support of an objection to such testimony.
3. The use of an overview witness early in a case 
poses more problems than the use of a summary 
witness later in a case (although both uses pose 
risks), because late in a case the parties and the 
court are able to compare the summary witness’s 
testimony with the evidence already presented 
and to object to variances or improper lay opin-
ions about that evidence. Early in a case, it is more 
difficult to know whether the overview witness’s 
testimony will be entirely consistent with evidence 
not yet presented and/or whether a lay opinion is 
supported by sufficient personal knowledge.
4. In sum, the prosecution, the defense, and the 
trial court share an interest in avoiding the use of 
overview witnesses, for as Moore observed, “[t]his 
court now having made clear the exacerbated ‘ob-
vious dangers’ of the overview witness testifying 
about evidence yet to be admitted before the jury 
affords all parties clear direction to avoid unnec-
essary risks—for the prosecutor of an overturned 
conviction, for the defense of an unfair trial, and 
for the district court of having to retry a case.” (Id. 
at 61.)
5. Forgoing the use of an overview witness ought 
not to leave government lawyers feeling that they 
will not have an adequate opportunity to explain 
complex cases. As Moore reminds, “this court’s 
long-held view of the purpose of the opening state-
ment to the jury, namely to allow the prosecutor 
the opportunity to provide the jury with an objec-
tive overview of the evidence that the government 
intends to introduce at trial, has long afforded the 
prosecutor the opportunity to do that for which the 
prosecutor improperly used FBI Agent Sparks.” (Id. 
(citations omitted).) n
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